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BEYOND CORPORATE CONTRACT: A RESPONSE TO
HELEN HERSHKOFF & MARCEL KAHAN, FORUMSELECTION PROVISIONS IN CORPORATE “CONTRACTS”
Verity Winship*
Abstract: Corporate charters and bylaws sometimes limit where shareholders can sue. These
forum terms are commonplace in sophisticated commercial contracts. Their migration into
corporate documents, however, set off a fight about the balance between private ordering and
public restraint in corporate law. This essay and the Article to which it responds propose
alternative analyses of the corporate “contract” and the state’s role in defining it. Both also
wrestle with how to translate these fundamental concepts into advice for the judges and litigants
on the ground. This essay looks at the benefits of existing protections—fiduciary duties and
reasonableness limits. It then broadens the lens to consider how a heightened consent
mechanism might accommodate the nuances in this area. This approach takes concerns about
consent seriously, but also takes into account the need to balance respect for private ordering
with the state’s special role in organizing and governing corporations.
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INTRODUCTION
TriQuint Semiconductor—a Delaware corporation with Oregon
headquarters—merged with another company in the high-tech industry
in 2015. Two days before merger plans were announced, the TriQuint
directors adopted a corporate bylaw that made the Delaware Chancery
Court the only place to bring state corporate law claims, including those
challenging the merger.1 Nonetheless, plaintiff shareholders brought five
*

. Professor, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. See Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328, 330 (Or. 2015); TriQuint
Semiconductor, Inc., Amendment to Second Amended and Restated Bylaws of TriQuint
Semiconductor,
Inc.,
art.
XI
(Form
8-K)
(Feb.
22,
2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/913885/000119312514063841/d681010dex32.htm
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suits against the company and its directors, some in Oregon and some in
Delaware.2 They alleged that the board members underpriced the
TriQuint stock in return for “lucrative board positions in the new
corporation.”3 They also fought over whether they could litigate in
Oregon court, forcing the Oregon court to decide whether forumselection bylaws like TriQuint’s were enforceable.4
Helen Hershkoff and Marcel Kahan’s Article, Forum-Selection
Provisions in Corporate “Contracts,” addresses itself to that Oregon
court. It sets itself two difficult goals: (1) to lay out a “properly
conceived approach to corporate forum-terms” with detail about how the
approach “would operate in practice” and (2) to use this detailed analysis
“as a window into larger issues of state power and private ordering.”5
The authors resist treating corporate charter terms and bylaws as
contracts because underlying consent is limited and because the state has
a special role in corporate formation and agreements. They then use
these two features—limited consent and the state’s role—to develop
guidance for courts that have to decide whether to enforce forumselection bylaws and charter provisions.
The authors contrast themselves with commentators who call for
fulsome use of dispute resolution terms in this context. And certainly
some commentators have heralded these terms as a welcome stake in the
heart of shareholder litigation.6 But ultimately the authors’ answer to
“Are these terms valid?” is “sometimes.”7 Which leaves them in the

[https://perma.cc/LX2P-MBGT] (designating the Delaware Chancery Court as the “sole and
exclusive forum” for a list of claim categories that can be roughly summarized as state corporate
law claims).
2. Triquint, 364 P.3d at 330.
3. Id.
4. Complaint at 5, Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328 (Feb. 28, 2014) (No.
1402-02441), 2014 WL 842387.
5. Helen Hershkoff & Marcel Kahan, Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate “Contracts”, 93
WASH. L. REV. 265, 286, 267 (2018).
6. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Allowing Fee Shifting Bylaws as a Privately
Ordered Solution to the Shareholder Litigation Epidemic (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/thecase-for-allowing-feeshifting-bylaws-as-a-privately-ordered-solution-to-the-shareholderlitigat.html
[https://perma.cc/P957-D8SD] (advocating the use of fee-shifting bylaws to address “a serious
litigation crisis in American corporate law”).
7. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 270 (“Although the contractual paradigm is not a
sufficient basis for the blanket enforcement of corporate forum-terms, we recognize that, in some
situations, corporate forum terms may be beneficial.”).
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tricky position of having to get into the details and draw lines. (I write
this with sympathy, since “sometimes” is also my answer.)8
In doing so, the authors run into difficult questions: What is a
corporation? What is shareholder consent? What is an “ordinary
contract” to which these corporate organizational documents should be
compared? In other words, they run into all of the fundamental questions
that make digging into this sometimes-seemingly-technical area of the
law worthwhile.
The authors cabin these unwieldy questions with two main moves.
First, their discussion is limited to forum-selection terms.9 Forum terms
are not the only charter provision or bylaw designed to shape
intracorporate litigation, and many provisions raise similar questions
about shareholder consent and the role of the state in the corporate
“contract.” However, the authors focus on forum selection, ignoring the
bestiary of other possible dispute resolution terms—mandatory
arbitration, jury waivers, discovery limits, fee-shifting, no-pay
provisions, etc. Also absent is the even greater catalog of bylaws and
charter provisions that do not deal with litigation and disputes, but that
are implicated by any discussion of whether corporate charters and
bylaws count as contracts.
The authors’ second cabining move is to couch the Article as
guidance for the judge of the forum that was not selected by the term:
the Oregon court in the TriQuint example. For forum-selection clauses,
this is where the real action takes place, when the court must decide
whether to dismiss in favor of the selected forum.
This essay comments primarily on the authors’ critique of the
contractual view and on their practical advice, inevitably leaving out
many of the interesting complications that the authors raise. The essay
begins in Part I by providing a brief history. Particularly when the focus
is on intracorporate forum selection, it is difficult to divorce these terms
from how they emerged. In fact, many of the reasons the authors give to
enforce certain terms are rooted in the specific context in which they
began to be adopted and tested.10
8. See generally Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2016)
[hereinafter Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract] (proposing a framework that encourages
tailoring of corporate litigation but also limits waiver).
9. Although forum-selection terms can be either exclusive or permissive (also called “consent to
jurisdiction” clauses), the Article seems aimed primarily at terms that restrict litigation to a
particular forum (i.e., exclusive forum terms).
10. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 310 (indicating that enforcement of some forumselection terms promotes public policy in the context of ubiquitous M&A litigation and the
Delaware courts’ crackdown on disclosure-only settlements).
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Part II addresses the two main points of the Article: that charters and
bylaws are not the same as “ordinary contracts” and that the state has a
special involvement with corporate organization. It points to agreement
on some of the fundamentals, acknowledging differences between
certain contracts and corporate organizational documents, complications
in the nature of shareholder consent, and the special role of the state in
corporate law.
Part III outlines an alternative approach. Existing tests of fiduciary
duties and fundamental fairness address many of the concerns about
forum-selection terms that the authors raise. This is particularly true in
the core situation of shareholder representative litigation channeled into
courts in the state of incorporation. Because the Article is couched as
advice to the judge, this essay also takes that approach. This essay
suggests grounds for distinguishing among terms that do not require as
much bold engagement with tough constitutional questions or as harsh a
critique of the organizing state. It concludes by broadening the lens to
consider the promise of heightened consent as a way to accommodate
the nuances in this area.
I.

CORPORATE FORUM TERMS EMERGE

Why do corporations organize in Delaware? According to the state’s
official website, businesses “take advantage of Delaware’s complete
package of incorporation services, including modern and flexible
corporate laws, our highly-respected Judiciary and legal community, a
business-friendly government, and the customer-service-oriented staff of
the Division of Corporations.”11 Nevada similarly advertises the
efficiency of the state’s Business Court, “[d]eveloped on the Delaware
model,” as a reason to organize a business in Nevada.12
Although these states advertise both law and forum, these are not
necessarily a package. Shareholder and other intracorporate plaintiffs
have access to courts in the incorporating state, but can bring suits
11. Incorporate
in
Delaware,
DELAWARE.GOV,
https://delaware.gov/topics/incorporateindelaware.shtml [https://perma.cc/TU42-3EAC]; see also
LEWIS LS. BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP’T OF STATE DIV. OF CORPS., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE
DELAWARE
1
(2007),
https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6LC-W5RV] (stating that “the source of Delaware’s prestige” is not only its
corporate statute, but also the Delaware courts, “and, in particular, Delaware’s highly respected
corporations court, the Court of Chancery”).
12. The Nevada Advantage, NEV. SEC’Y OF STATE, https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/businesses/thenevada-advantage [https://perma.cc/MC3Y-MJLA] (advertising Nevada’s low taxes and fees as
well as its Nevada Business Court that “minimizes the time, cost and risks of commercial
litigation”).
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elsewhere as well. The internal affairs doctrine provides that, no matter
where intracorporate suits are brought, the law of the incorporating state
defines the duties and the rights of the internal corporate actors—
directors, shareholders, officers, and the corporation.13 But the forum is
not restricted.14 Or, more precisely, it has only the usual jurisdictional
restrictions that are not specific to corporate law, and that usually allow
filing where the corporation is headquartered as well.15
Nonetheless, good, practical reasons drove this lumping of corporate
law and forum. As a matter of practice, Delaware corporate law claims
were filed in Delaware court (especially the Chancery Court). Illinois
corporate law claims were filed in Illinois court. And so on.16 This
practice led commentators to consider forum and choice of law together,
pointing to in-state courts as well as the content of the state’s corporate
law to explain Delaware’s predominance in public company
incorporations.17
In the early 2000s, the growth of a particular type of corporate
litigation put pressure on this shorthand treatment of corporate law and
forum as bundled. Shareholder plaintiffs challenged almost every merger
or acquisition.18 A key aspect of these suits was that they were filed in
multiple jurisdictions. In TriQuint, for example, lawyers filed
representative suits on behalf of shareholders in Delaware, the state of
incorporation. Other lawyers challenged the same corporate deal on

13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
14. This was not always so. The “internal affairs doctrine” designates the law of the incorporating
state as the law governing internal corporate affairs. See id. But once upon a time, the internal
affairs doctrine was jurisdictional as well, restricting Delaware intracorporate claims to Delaware
courts. See Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253, 258 (1883) (“[A]ll such [internal management]
controversies must be determined by the courts of the state by which the corporation was created.”).
15. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) (providing
for general jurisdiction where “the corporation is fairly regarded as at home”); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137–38 (2014) (identifying the principal place of business and incorporating
state as “home” for corporations).
16. See generally John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 605 (2012).
17. See generally Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group
Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85 (1990); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition
Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1909 (1998).
18. Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2012 (Feb. 2, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1998482) (finding that 38.7% of
completed takeovers were challenged in 2005 and 94.2% in 2011); Matthew D. Cain & Steven
Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015 2 (Jan. 14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890) (finding that 94.9% of completed takeovers were
challenged in litigation in 2014 and 87.7% in 2015).
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behalf of the same shareholders in Oregon, where the company was
headquartered.19
These suits were brought in state courts, raising a problem peculiar to
this aspect of U.S. federalism: the U.S. court system has no easy
mechanism of consolidation and coordination from state court to state
court.20 The Delaware legislature could not simply write a statute
restricting Delaware-law claims to Delaware courts.21 The states were
thus stuck with relying on forum non conveniens, principles of comity,
informal coordination with other states’ judges, or a more daunting
project of state-to-state coordination through uniform laws. Another
alternative was to have private parties insert forum-selection terms in
corporate documents and then rely on other states’ courts to enforce
them.22
Eventually parties in these multijurisdictional deal suits settled on the
last option: to include terms in corporate charters and bylaws that
restricted suits to the state of incorporation—mostly Delaware. The
possibility of using exclusive forum provisions had been percolating in
the defense bar,23 then invited (at least for charter provisions) by the
Delaware Chancery Court,24 then adopted by a few companies,25 then
tested and approved in court.26
Ultimately, these provisions were the subject of state-level legislative
intervention. Part of the prompt for legislation was a development
regarding another type of term that, like forum selection, sets the rules
for intracorporate disputes. In 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court
approved a particularly ferocious fee-shifting provision.27 The provision
seemed designed to chill shareholder litigation entirely because it
19. Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328, 330 (Or. 2015).
20. See Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX
LITIG. 51, 88 (2012) [hereinafter Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction].
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Ted Mirvis, Anywhere but Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests Some
Solutions, 7 M&A J. 17 (May 2007).
24. In re Revlon Inc. Shareholders’ Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and valuepromoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter provisions
selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”).
25. See, e.g., Chevron Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/000095012310090397/f56977e8vk.htm
[https://perma.cc/TTM3-92MW].
26. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 938–39 (Del. Ch. 2013).
27. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014) (approving a feeshifting bylaw in a Delaware nonstock corporation).
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required shareholder plaintiffs to cover fees unless success was total and
on the merits—a very unusual mix in this context.28
Delaware’s legislative response was to elaborate on the permissibility
of including any of three types of clauses in the corporate charters and
bylaws of Delaware corporations: exclusive forum, mandatory
arbitration, and fee-shifting provisions. Of most relevance here, the
legislation allowed exclusive forum-selection provisions to be included
in a corporation’s charter or bylaws, provided that they did not exclude
the courts of the incorporating state.29
The rise of these forum-selection charter provisions and bylaws—and
the near-simultaneous rise and then fall of fee-shifting provisions and
bylaws30—put pressure on courts, legislators, and commentators to
define more carefully the nature of corporate organizational documents
(especially their relation to contract), the documents’ scope, and the
extent to which litigation should be considered a right of shareholders.
Hershkoff and Kahan’s Article, Forum-Selection Provisions in
Corporate “Contracts,” is part of the growing literature responding to
this development.
II.

RESISTING “CONTRACT”

As to the Article’s first point, the quotation marks in the title say it
all: Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate “Contracts.” The authors
resist “reflexive” enforcement of exclusive forum terms included in
corporate charters and bylaws on the ground that they are contractual.31
Corporate charters and bylaws, they argue, are not the same as what they
refer to as “ordinary contracts.”32 Why? Shareholder consent is lacking,
and the state has a special role in corporate contracts—more than it does
in every contract.
The authors are not alone in suggesting that corporate charters and
bylaws are not the same as commercial contracts among sophisticated
players. Even courts that use the contractual label talk about these
28. Id.
29. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (West 2018). The express statutory permission was limited
to “internal corporate claims,” defined as “claims, including claims in the right of the corporation,
(i) that are based upon a violation of a duty by a current or former director or officer or stockholder
in such capacity, or (ii) as to which this title confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Chancery.” Id.
30. See id. §§ 102(f), 109(b) (prohibiting Delaware corporations from including certain feeshifting provisions in charters and bylaws); ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 555.
31. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 270.
32. Id. at 268–69, 271, 277–78, 280 (comparing corporate charters and bylaws to “ordinary
contracts”).
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organizational documents as “part of” a “flexible contract.”33 Other
courts acknowledge that shareholders do not literally sign off on every
term, or they analogize organizational documents to contracts for
particular purposes, such as to impose interpretive rules.34 The rationale
instead is consent to a governance structure that then gives rise to,
among other things, the possibility of unilateral director amendment of
bylaws.35
Shareholders of the same company vary in their relationship to the
organizational documents with very few, if any, in the same position as a
sophisticated player who reads, negotiates, and signs an agreement. How
much shareholder consent resembles robust and idealized contractual
consent depends in part on whether the term at issue was in a charter or
bylaws and when the shareholder bought the shares.36
A few examples give a sense of the complexities. A charter provision
that appears in the IPO documents gives notice, but is sticky as it can
only be changed with a shareholder vote. Midstream amendment to the
charter requires a shareholder vote, but a shareholder could vote against
it and still be bound by the majority. Bylaws generally can be amended
unilaterally by management, giving no notice of the specific term and
raising concerns about conflicts when the directors are defendants.
The authors compare the organizational documents to “ordinary
contracts,” but it is not entirely fair to contrast these corporate
documents with idealized versions of consent and contract. The
existence of relationship contracts, contracts of adhesion, and other
variants put pressure on the notion of an “ordinary contract.”37 For

33. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(“[T]he bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute part of a binding broader contract among the
directors, officers, and stockholders . . . .”); id. at 957 (calling the contract “inherently flexible”).
34. Id.; Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010) (calling bylaws
“contracts among a corporation’s shareholders” as a prelude to applying principles of contract
interpretation). See generally Verity Winship, Litigation Rights and the Corporate Contract, in THE
CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES ch. 12 (William Savitt et al. eds., 2018); Ann M.
Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and
Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 587–88 (2016).
35. Boilermakers Local, 73 A.3d at 938–39. Even the Delaware statute concerning forum
selection terms is built on the presumption that charters and bylaws do not count as contracts for the
Federal Arbitration Act, as its prohibition of arbitration clauses might otherwise impermissibly
burden arbitration.
36. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Consent in Corporate Law, 70 BUS. LAW. 161, 166 (2014).
37. Although not at the center of their analysis, the authors mention some of these examples. See,
e.g., Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 284 n.93.
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example, it is not clear that shareholders give less consent than
consumers when they click “I agree.”38
At root, though, the authors argue that “blanket enforcement” of the
forum selection terms in charters and bylaws cannot be justified by a
reference to the talisman of shareholder consent.39 For now this
discussion will borrow the authors’ working definition of corporate
charters and bylaws as “hybrid legal structures that provide a mechanism
for collective choice in the context of substantial state regulation and
straddle the public-private divide,”40 even if one could fight about how
dissimilar they are from contracts (and which contracts provide the
source of comparison).
Because corporate charters and bylaws are not contracts, the argument
goes, courts are not bound by the rationales of the core U.S. Supreme
Court cases that consider—and favor the enforcement of—contractual
forum-selection clauses more generally. The courts are not bound by the
U.S. Supreme Court’s directive in The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.41
that forum-selection clauses “should control absent a strong showing
that they should be set aside.”42 Nor are they bound by the Court’s
enforcement of a forum-selection clause in small print on the back of a
cruise ticket (sent to passengers after the sale) in Carnival Cruise Lines,
Inc. v. Shute.43 Courts are thus free to consider forum-selection terms in
corporate charters and bylaws without a presumption that they are valid.
So, what should courts consider? The Article proposes ways in which
the lack of robust consent and the state’s special role should shape the
court’s analysis.
A.

The Limits of Consent

Although consent is key to the authors’ critique of treating charters
and bylaws as contracts, the Article provides little guidance as to how
the lack of robust consent affects what courts should consider. The
authors argue that when no consent at all is given (e.g., creditor
plaintiffs), these terms should not be enforced regardless of whether
38. Cf. Boilermakers Local, 73 A.3d at 957–58 (pointing out that shareholders have more
recourse than consumers, who are unable to negotiate terms).
39. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 270.
40. Id. at 268.
41. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
42. Id. at 15.
43. 499 U.S. 585, 593–95 (1991); cf. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 62
(2013) (directing courts to give forum selection clauses controlling weight in transfers among
federal courts absent “extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties”).
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claims fall within Delaware’s broad statutory language.44 They later
suggest that the non-selected court (e.g., the Oregon court in TriQuint)
should consider “the extent of the shareholders’ consent to the forumterm,”45 but give little help in making that suggestion operational.
Frankly, this gap is understandable, particularly given the varied
relationships of shareholders to the corporate organizational documents.
One could deem all unilaterally adopted bylaws invalid. But the authors
do not do that; they “do not see the absence of full shareholder consent
as sufficient for treating the forum term as unenforceable.”46 Indeed, to
consider all unilateral bylaws suspect could nullify the state statutes that
permit corporate management to take these unilateral actions.47
Moreover, an underlying rationale exists for giving directors the
ability to amend bylaws unilaterally. Picture a change to some innocuous
housekeeping bylaw. And then picture one that is more problematic.
Because they are both unilaterally adopted, a court needs something
besides the concept of consent to distinguish between the two. Fiduciary
duties and review for fundamental fairness may be more apt tools, as
explored below.
Consent may also fail to provide much of a limiting factor for a
potentially large category of provisions. Midstream adoption
characterized the early examples. However, some evidence suggests that
Delaware companies are moving towards including forum selection in
the boilerplate of IPO charters.48 More empirical work is needed, but if
that is the case, consent will not provide a limit for this large category
under the authors’ framework: charter provisions have the “strongest
case for consent,” in part because shareholders are on notice.49
B.

Can Delaware Really Do That?

What about the state’s special role in corporate organizational
documents? How should that affect whether courts should enforce a
forum-selection term? The authors raise an interesting question about
44. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 293–94.
45. Id. at 299.
46. Id. at 271.
47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West 2018); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016).
48. A study of adoption by Delaware companies through 2014 identified a movement towards
including forum selection in the boilerplate of IPO charters in Delaware public companies. See
Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder
Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31 (2017).
49. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 282.
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Delaware’s (and several other states’) approach. By statute, since 2015,
Delaware permits exclusive forum terms in charters and bylaws, but
only if they do not exclude the incorporating state.50 Several states have
enacted similar statutes since.51
Based on these statutes, the authors ask whether “the intermediary of
the ‘corporate contract’ permit[s] the state to achieve indirectly goals
that it could not achieve directly because of constitutional limits on
government power?”52 A statute that simply declared that Delaware
courts had exclusive jurisdiction over Delaware corporate law claims
would run into constitutional limits.53 Does the Delaware statute limiting
private parties’ ability to select a forum have the same defects?
Rather than provide a definitive answer, the authors build these
concerns into their advice for the considering court as reasons to
invalidate a clause.54 This intriguing question is not, however, entirely in
harmony with the frame of advice-giving. Companies are not required to
adopt an exclusive forum bylaw at all, so there seems to be an
intervening actor and choice. It is also not clear why courts should
punish litigants for the alleged overreaching of the incorporating state,
particularly when they might have chosen the incorporating state even
without the statutory restriction.
It may also be quite uninviting for a sister court to pass judgment on
the ability of the Delaware or other state legislature to pass such a
statute. Particularly if the approach forces the court to distinguish
between permissible motives (“self-promotion when the challenged law
is aimed at favoring the state itself or its subdivisions”) and
impermissible ones (“promot[ion of] the private interest of the local
bar”).55 And it may be equally uninviting to consider the difficult
questions (which the authors do not definitively answer either) about
whether the constitutionality of the state legislation changes when
couched as a limit on private ordering rather than a direct limit on where
suits may be brought. In sum, whether Delaware can pass such a statute

50. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115.
51. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-113(b)(2)(ii) (West 2018) (“The charter or
bylaws of a corporation may not prohibit bringing an internal corporate claim in the courts of this
State or a federal court sitting in this State.”).
52. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 269.
53. See Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 88
(analyzing the constitutional limits on such a potential statute, prompted by early signs that
corporate litigation was moving out of Delaware).
54. See Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, section III.A.
55. Id. at 291.
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is unanswered, and non-Delaware courts seem unlikely to step in and fill
the gap.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Being a critic is easy; it is much more difficult to identify alternatives.
Outlined below is an alternative route to the authors’ desired result: that
courts avoid simply deferring to forum-selection charter provisions and
bylaws on the basis of consent. This Part develops the suggestion that
existing doctrines may take care of many of the problems that the
authors identify.
Because dispute resolution terms vary widely and some have dramatic
effect on shareholder litigation, it is also worth considering more broadly
applicable ways to identify permissible terms. This Part concludes by
considering how heightened consent requirements might accommodate
some of the nuances in this area.
A.

Back to Basics

The authors note that they are least worried about representative suits
by shareholders, particularly in the context of ubiquitous deal litigation.
This is the circumstance of the TriQuint litigation, and the framework
the authors propose does little to change the outcome there (unless the
Oregon court should punish litigants for Delaware’s legislation).
Existing doctrines address other problematic examples that the
authors give, such as non-shareholder plaintiffs or suits brought in outof-the-way courts. Courts can determine whether a term was adopted in
violation of fiduciary duties; evaluate whether a forum-selection clause
is fundamentally fair and consistent with public policy; or use both of
these existing frameworks, as did the TriQuint court.56
If the degree of consent provides limited guidance and the state role is
difficult to implement, what remains are the classic concerns about
forum-selection clauses and the classic solutions, with an overlay of
corporate law. Three main worries seem to motivate the authors here: an
unfair process of adoption, unfair content, and third-party effects.
The Process of Adoption Was Unfair. Courts could say that these
terms are always unfair if unilaterally adopted. But not every bylaw is
suspect. As noted above, it is necessary to have some way of
56. In TriQuint, the Oregon court eventually enforced the forum-selection term, and the litigation
was resolved in Delaware courts. Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328, 338 (Or.
2015); Granted Notice and [Proposed] Order of Voluntary Dismissal, In re TriQuint Semiconductor,
Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9415-VCN (Del. Ch. Jan. 20, 2015).
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distinguishing among terms on the spectrum from innocuous
housekeeping to insidious self-dealing.
So, what can be done if the answer is that forum-selection terms are
sometimes unfair? This is where existing fiduciary duty analyses can do
some work. To determine whether directors adopted the clause in
violation of their fiduciary duties, timing matters, as do conflicts of
interest. The Delaware Supreme Court established such a fiduciary
review in a case where it invalidated bylaws that advanced the
shareholder meeting date and moved the meeting to a remote location.57
Although the directors had the power to adopt such bylaws unilaterally
under corporate law, the bylaws were invalid because directors adopted
them to perpetuate themselves in office.58 Similarly, courts could
invalidate forum-terms adopted for inequitable purposes. The fiduciary
duty solution is imperfect, but may be able to address some of the
excesses that the authors depict.
The Content of the Clause Gives Its Adopter an Unfair Advantage.
The authors also point to worries that the selected forum is far away,
putting pressure on the prospective plaintiff, or that procedures in the
selected forum disfavor the plaintiff. Forum-selection terms might also
cause suits to be split between different courts or force them to take
place without important players.
Again, existing doctrines may be enough to address many of these
concerns. The Carnival Cruise Lines Court called for “judicial scrutiny
for fundamental fairness.”59 A non-chosen court could consider whether
a forum-selection term was “reasonable” by treating the organizational
documents as contractual for this purpose and applying the
“reasonableness” requirement (arguably in a more robust form than
some courts have engaged).60 Or courts could reason by analogy,
without conceding the bigger point that charter and bylaws are “ordinary
contracts.” As the authors point out, their argument allows for treating
governance documents “as analogous to contracts in certain respects.”61
This reasonableness analysis may be attractive to the non-chosen
court because it does not require difficult questions about consent and
57. Schnell v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
58. Id.
59. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
60. See id.
61. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 281 n.79 (“Our argument that charters and bylaws lack
the degree of consent found in ordinary contracts does not imply that these governance documents
should not be treated as analogous to contracts in certain respects . . . . What is significant is
determining when and why the contractual paradigm should dominate and when it should not.”).
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other states’ motives. It may also be attractive for choice-of-law reasons.
Courts often apply the incorporating state’s law to the question of
whether these organizational documents are contracts, but may apply
their own law to questions about reasonableness and public policy,62
leaving more space for interpretation and legal development.
The Term Affects Third Parties. The Article argues that the Delaware
legislation defining permissible forum-selection terms could cover
claims by creditors or others for whom no argument about consent, even
the most attenuated, is plausible.63 The authors interpret the statutory
language to permit terms to reach fiduciary duty, federal securities law,
and even employment discrimination claims.64 They identify creditors as
an example of non-consenting third parties who might have claims in
these categories.
But a discussion of which claims are covered cannot ignore whose
claims are covered. It seems unlikely that the statute means that anyone
with a fiduciary duty, securities law claim, or employment
discrimination claim against the company and its directors is bound by
the term. Cases considering forum-selection clauses in other contexts
routinely consider who is bound by the agreement containing the
clause.65 While the Delaware corporate legislation focuses on defining
the types of claims, the underlying assumption is likely that the claims
must be of the parties to the corporate charter and bylaws, which are
variously listed as shareholders, the company, or the state—not, notably,
creditors.66
The comparable question becomes: When are non-signatories bound
by a forum-selection clause? The general rule in Delaware, for example,
is that “only the formal parties to a contract are bound by its terms,”
including forum-selection terms.67 Exceptions exist, however. Nonsignatories may be bound if the forum-selection clause is valid, the
defendants are “third-party beneficiaries, or closely related to, the
62. William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It
Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 17 (2006); see Roberts v.
TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P.3d 328, 330 (Or. 2015).
63. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 294; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (West 2018).
64. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 294.
65. See, e.g., Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383–84 (2d Cir. 2007) (listing four
factors for courts to consider when deciding whether to enforce a forum selection clause, including
“whether the claims and parties involved in the suit are subject to the forum selection clause”
(emphasis added)).
66. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 281.
67. Alliance Data Sys. Corp. v. Blackstone Capital Partners V L.P., 963 A.2d 746, 760 (Del. Ch.
2009).
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contract,”68 and “the agreement containing the forum selection clause
[is] the agreement that gives rise to the substantive claims brought by or
against a non-signatory.”69 “Closely related” requires something more
than the relationship between shareholders and creditors of the same
company; the party must receive a direct benefit or foreseeably be bound
by the agreement. These limits on applying forum-selection clauses to
non-signatories developed outside the corporate context might very well
be used to limit third-party effects here, contract or not.
B.

Heightened Consent

Most of this essay has responded to the Article’s first goal: to develop
an operational framework for judicial review of corporate forum terms.
This last section addresses the Article’s second and broader goal: to use
this analysis as “a window into larger issues of state power and private
ordering.”70
The authors suggest a suite of private and public concerns that are
specific to one particular type of dispute resolution term. Guidance for
the other categories, especially mandatory arbitration, is beyond the
Article’s scope. Nonetheless, it is worth pausing to think about what a
broader approach might look like, particularly because forum-selection
terms may not cause the biggest fight. Mid-stream adoption may be a
transitional problem; this is an empirical question. But more importantly,
with the limits above—a reasonable forum, consistent with fiduciary
duties, and fundamentally fair—these forum-selection clauses preserve
shareholder litigation and access to court, while addressing some of
shareholder litigation’s defects.
What would a broader approach require? As in the specific example
of forum-selection terms, it needs two things: a way to distinguish
between permissible and impermissible terms, and a way to balance
private ordering with the public aspects of corporations.
One basis for identifying permissible terms is to consider dispute
resolution terms in corporate charters and bylaws most acceptable where
68. Weygandt v. Weco, LLC, No. 4056-VCS, 2009 WL 1351808, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 14, 2009).
69. Id. at *4 n.15; see also In re Optimal U.S. Litig., 813 F. Supp. 2d 383, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“In order to bind a non-party [to the contract] to a forum selection clause, the party must be closely
related to the dispute such that it becomes foreseeable that it will be bound. A non-party is closely
related to a dispute if its interests are completely derivative of and directly related to, if not
predicated upon the signatory party’s interests or conduct.”); Pegasus Strategic Partners v. Stroden,
No. 653523/2015, 2016 WL 3386980, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 20, 2016) (citing Freeford Ltd. v.
Pendleton, 53 A.D.3d 32, 38–39 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)).
70. Hershkoff & Kahan, supra note 5, at 267.
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they alter default rules in corporate law, and least acceptable where they
effectively waive substantive requirements.71 This approach roots the
limits on procedural private ordering in the substantive law. It thus
allows for variation in the treatment of different legal areas governing
corporations, especially distinguishing between state corporate law and
federal securities law.
Regardless of the basis for distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible terms, these limitations can interact with concerns about
consent. Worries about a particular bylaw, charter provision, or category
of provisions could trigger a requirement of heightened consent. No
longer would it be sufficient to deem shareholders to consent to a
governance structure that eventually gives rise to a particular term.
Instead, a shareholder vote could be required. (Though this consent is
still not equivalent to an “ordinary contract,” because shareholders
would be bound by a majority vote.) Or, as the authors mention, the
shareholder must have voted for a particular amendment. Or a court or
legislature could require a signed agreement.
Use of heightened consent has precedents, even in the area of
intracorporate dispute resolution. For example, Delaware’s fee-shifting
legislation is explicit about the role of heightened consent. Although it
bars fee-shifting provisions in charters and bylaws, its legislative history
affirmatively contemplates fee-shifting clauses in agreements signed by
the shareholder against whom the terms are enforced.72 Another example
comes from shareholder arbitration, where at least one court required
explicit consent to an arbitration bylaw.73
A heightened consent approach takes concerns about consent
seriously, but also takes into account the need to balance respect for
private ordering with the state’s special role in corporations.

71. The points in this section are elaborated in Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract,
supra note 8, at 524–28.
72. S.B. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015) (enacted) (amending DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102, 109(b)) (West 2018); id. at Synopsis §§ 2–5 (noting that the amendment “is not
intended . . . to prevent the application of such [fee-shifting] provisions pursuant to a stockholders
agreement or other writing signed by the stockholder against whom the provision is to be
enforced”).
73. See Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 158, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2009)
(holding that a shareholder could not be “compelled to arbitrate her civil rights claims pursuant to
corporate bylaws to which she has not explicitly assented”).
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CONCLUSION
The above is a friendly critique. Corporate organizational documents
and the shareholder’s relationship to them differ in many ways from
other settings that involve contract and consent. And the state clearly has
a historical and current role in defining the rights and duties of corporate
actors. Turning these general observations into operational directions is
more challenging, and this essay introduces some alternative approaches.
But Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate “Contracts” provides a
nuanced account, intriguing observations, and welcome participation in
the broader debate over the balance between private ordering and public
restraint in corporate law.

